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1. Locating the Topic 
 
According to the hypothesis of extended cognition (henceforth ExC), the machinery of  
mind sometimes extends beyond the skull and skin. To put things another way, the 
defining claim of ExC is that, contra the neuro-centrism of most modern cognitive 
science and most modern naturalistic philosophy of mind, the parts of the physical 
world that instantiate or implement cognitive states and processes are sometimes 
spread out over the brain, the non-neural body and the beyond-the-skin 
environment. More precisely still, ExC is the view that there are actual (in this world) 
cases of intelligent thought and action, in which the material vehicles that realize the 
thinking and thoughts concerned are spatially distributed over brain, body and 
world, in such a way that certain external (beyond-the-skull-and-skin) factors are 
rightly accorded cognitive status. In this final formulation of the view, the term 
‘cognitive status’ is really just a place-holder for ‘whatever status it is that we 
standardly grant the brain, in cognitive science and naturalistic philosophy of mind, 
when talking about the causal wellsprings of intelligent thought and action’, 
although ultimately more would need to be said about exactly what that means.1 
Eye-catching examples of external elements that advocates of ExC often take to have 
cognitive status (in the relevant sense) include smartphones, tablets and at least 
some instances of wearable computing, but, in the end, nothing much hangs on such 
feats of contemporary technological wizardry. Less fancy items such as notebooks 
(the old-fashioned kind), tally sticks and abacuses would, under the right 
circumstances, do just as well. The phrase ‘under the right circumstances’ is, of 
                                                             
1 The first-stop presentation of ExC is by Clark and Chalmers (1998). Clark’s own 
more recent treatment may be found in (Clark 2008). For a field-defining collection 
that places the original Clark and Chalmers paper alongside a range of 
developments, criticisms and defences of the notion of extended cognition, see 
(Menary 2010). The third statement of ExC that figures in the opening sentences of 
the present paper is my own preferred formulation, one that I have been using, with 
minor variations, for a while (see e.g. Wheeler 2010, 2013, 2014). As far as I can tell, 
my way of expressing the view doesn’t have any alarmingly idiosyncratic features, 
and so should be broadly acceptable to all the main protagonists in the debate.     
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course, a writhing nest of philosophical serpents, and most of the debate over ExC 
might be cast as a dispute over whether those serpents can be pacified. Nevertheless, 
in what follows, I am going to pretend that that debate is not only over, but that the 
right side has won. In other words, I am going to work on the assumption that ExC 
is true: cognitive extension sometimes happens. What do we fight about now?  
 
The answer, I submit, is phenomenal consciousness, that much-discussed (in 
philosophy anyway) what-it’s-like-ness of experience – what it’s like for me to see red, 
taste a vindaloo, or, as I’m doing right now, listen to Fripp and Eno. One’s first 
reaction to this suggestion might be that the proposed flashpoint of phenomenal 
consciousness is, in reality, nothing more than a damp squib, at least for advocates of 
ExC. After all, given a broad enough interpretation of the term ‘cognition’ – one that, 
in effect, makes it interchangeable with the term ‘mind’, which is how these terms 
have typically been used in cognitive science – phenomenal consciousness is just one 
aspect of cognition, so surely if we have a mandate for extended cognition, we have 
a mandate for extended phenomenal consciousness. But any such thought would be 
much too quick. Recall that the truth of ExC requires only that some of the material 
realizers of cognition extend beyond the skin. This opens up a potential gap in 
relation to phenomenal consciousness, since phenomenally conscious states and 
processes might be (or might be among) the class of psychological phenomena 
whose material realizers aren’t ever extended.    
 
So much for the ‘in-principle’ situation. What do the authorities say?  Well, as it 
happens, even some of the most enthusiastic champions of ExC start to sweat and 
shuffle their feet at the mention of extended phenomenal consciousness. And some 
go beyond mere nervousness. Andy Clark (one of the original architects of ExC, see 
note 1) has criticized a number of arguments in the ExC literature that, in one way or 
another, are aimed at establishing the existence of extended phenomenal 
consciousness (e.g. arguments such as those found in Hurley and Noë 2003, Noë 
2004, and Thompson and Varela 2001). In addition, Clark has presented his own 
argument to the effect that, assuming the truth of (what he judges to be) our best 
current science of how consciousness happens, phenomenal consciousness remains a 
defiantly inner, neurally realized phenomenon (Clark 2009). Clark’s declared 
position, then, is that, as science stands, ExC is true, but only of certain unconscious 
or non-conscious cognitive states and processes, states such as dispositional belief.  
The details of Clark’s various arguments will not be the focus of attention today.2 I 
                                                             
2 For what it’s worth, my own view (un-argued-for here) is that Ward’s (2012) 
criticisms of Clark’s paper are broadly correct. Roughly, Ward argues that Clark 
misinterprets his opposition, because he (Clark) takes them to be arguing directly for 
the existence of subpersonal extended material vehicles of consciousness, when in 
truth they are arguing for a constitutive, personal-level account of the nature of 
conscious perception, although one that (Ward suggests) has implications for the 
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am recording his conclusion only to register the fact that it is possible to be a 
supporter of ExC while remaining an internalist about the material vehicles of  
phenomenal consciousness. Of course, as has already been intimated, not everyone 
in the ExC camp agrees with Clark’s internalism about consciousness – otherwise he 
wouldn’t have had anyone to criticize. However, even those more radical souls who 
maintain that the physical realizers of phenomenal consciousness are, at least 
sometimes, extended beyond the skin nevertheless tend to accept that the matter is 
not automatically settled by the same arguments and considerations as those that 
(we are assuming here) settle the case for other extended cognitive phenomena. For 
example, Alva Noë, in giving voice to what he takes to be the received thinking 
about such things, notes that ‘[i]t always seemed that there were obstacles to 
thinking that consciousness (in contrast with cognition) could extend beyond the 
limits of the skull’ (Noë 2004, p.219). One of Noë’s own proposals for how to get 
over such  apparent obstacles is discussed below. Right now the point that matters is 
this: the word on the street is (a) that phenomenal consciousness presents the 
advocates of ExC with an extra hurdle to be cleared, and (b) that further work is 
required to ascertain whether or not they can clear it.     
 
The new debate, then, is over the where-it’s-like-ness of what-it’s-like-ness. Let’s call 
the externalist claim on the table, the hypothesis of extended phenomenal consciousness 
(henceforth ExPC). According to ExPC, there are actual (in this world) cases of 
phenomenal consciousness in which the material vehicles that realize the 
phenomenally conscious states and processes concerned are spatially distributed 
over brain, body and world, in such a way that certain external (beyond-the-skull-
and-skin) factors are rightly accorded whatever status it is that we standardly grant 
the brain, in cognitive science and naturalistic philosophy of mind, when talking 
about the causal wellsprings of phenomenal consciousness. In other (simpler) words, 
                                                             
vehicular level. In terminology due to Susan Hurley that I’ll introduce briefly later in 
this paper (see also footnote 5 below), Clark may be said to confuse what-quality 
(constitutive) and quality-enabling (vehicular) levels of explanation. According to 
Ward, Clark’s misinterpretation of the structure of the pro-extended-consciousness 
case in question standardly results in his criticisms falling short of their intended 
targets.  This criticism seems right to me, although Ward and I will disagree about 
what precisely is entailed about the material vehicles of consciousness by the 
personal-level account on offer (Wheeler, in preparation). In a further volley against 
Clark, Ward proceeds to argue, also correctly in my assessment, that Clark’s positive 
case for internalism regarding consciousness (a case that turns on the claim that a 
certain capacity that science tells us is currently found only in brains is required for 
consciousness) establishes, at best, only that the material vehicles of consciousness 
must always include certain neural processes. It doesn’t establish what the vehicle 
internalist conclusion needs, which is that such processes are always sufficient for 
consciousness.    
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if ExPC is true, although the material vehicles that realize conscious phenomenal 
experience include, and maybe necessarily include, neural elements, they are not 
restricted to such elements. There will be cases in which those material vehicles also 
include not only non-neural bodily elements, but also elements located beyond the 
skull and skin.  
 
To keep our thinking straight here, it is worth emphasizing the fact that ExPC, as we 
are conceiving it, does not entail that the worldly object or state of affairs that one is 
phenomenally conscious of is part of the relevant material vehicle. The objects of 
phenomenal consciousness may remain external to the vehicle of such 
consciousness, even if the vehicle is now partly external with respect to the brain and 
body. Here is an illustrative example. Let’s assume that the sequence of movements 
that will deliver me to some previously unvisited destination is being assembled 
interactively, via the use of a navigation app on my mobile phone. If certain 
conditions are met, then the physical circuitry in my mobile phone will be part of the 
material realizer of my navigation-related cognitive states or processes. That’s just 
boring old ExC. But now let’s assume that various aspects of my activity are 
accompanied by states or processes with phenomenal character (some sort of what-
it’s-like-ness dimension), and that it is at least partly in virtue of such states or 
processes that I am conscious of various salient environmental features, such as 
roundabouts, junctions and landmarks. According to ExPC, if certain conditions are 
met, then the physical circuitry in my mobile phone will sometimes count as part of 
the material vehicle of my phenomenal-quality-realizing, environment-disclosing 
states or processes, whereas the roundabouts, junctions and landmarks that I’m 
conscious of won’t. One might state the general lesson like this: what ExPC requires 
is the (sometimes) extended character of the physical machinery that enables us to be 
conscious – in a phenomenal-quality-endowed way – of worldly objects or states of 
affairs.  
 
With ExPC in better view, it is time for us to narrow our focus to just one particular 
set of  considerations in the vicinity. As mentioned earlier, there are a number of 
arguments for ExPC already lodged in the literature, but there’s not enough room in 
a single paper to be exhaustive and one has to start somewhere. So I intend to 
concentrate on what I shall call arguments from sensory substitution. As the moniker 
suggests, arguments of this form endeavour to establish ExPC on the basis of a 
careful analysis of a well-documented psychological phenomenon, namely that of 
sensory substitution. As it will concern us here, sensory substitution (examples soon) 
occurs when technological augmentation enables one sensory modality, for instance 
touch, to support the kind of environmental access and interaction ordinarily 
supported by a different sensory modality, for instance vision.  There are important 
and difficult questions, both empirical and conceptual, raised by sensory 
substitution, regarding, for example, the individuation of the senses, and the 
character of crossmodal perceptual organization, questions that I shall touch on only 
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in passing (for more detail, see e.g. Auvray and Myin 2009, Macpherson 2011, Farina 
2013, Stiles and Shimojo, forthcoming). Here I am interested only in assessing 
whether cases of sensory substitution provide evidence for the truth of ExPC. To this 
end, I shall examine two arguments to the effect that they do, one due to Noë (2009) 
and one due to Kiverstein and Farina (2012).  My final conclusion (spoiler alert) will 
be that both of these arguments fall short. If the phenomenon of sensory substitution 
provides evidence for the truth of ExPC, it is not because of the considerations 
marshalled by these authors in the papers in question.     
 
2. The Tools for the Job  
 
Before turning to sensory substitution itself, I shall introduce a piece of conceptual 
apparatus, partly because it helps us to achieve a better understanding of ExPC, but 
also because I shall appeal to it – in what is, as we shall see, an aberrant fashion – at a 
key moment in what follows. The apparatus in question comes from Susan Hurley 
(2010). It’s what she calls the autonomy metaintuition for phenomenal qualities. I shall 
call it simply the autonomy metaintuition. As she puts it, ‘[the] autonomy 
metaintuition for phenomenal qualities is an expression of the intuition that there is 
an intractable explanatory gap between physical or functional properties and 
phenomenal qualities’ (Hurley 2010, p.104). Hurley introduces the autonomy 
metaintuition  during her discussion of a position that she calls what-quality 
externalism, according to which phenomenal quality (or character) is partly 
determined by external (beyond-the-skin) factors.  For philosophers anyway, 
perhaps the easiest way to get a grip on what-quality externalism as a position is to 
see it as the phenomenal-consciousness-related analogue of the more familiar 
philosophical view that Hurley calls what-content externalism (standardly known as 
just ‘content externalism’). According to what-content-externalism, the contents of 
mental states (e.g. what follows the ‘that’ clause in a belief attribution such as ‘Elsie 
believes that water is wet’) are partly determined by external factors, meaning that 
two thinkers who are internally identical in every way may nevertheless possess 
intentional states with different contents merely through being located in different 
environments.3 Analogously, the what-quality externalist holds that two thinkers 
who are internally identical in every way may nevertheless possess conscious states 
with different phenomenal qualities merely through being located in different 
environments.  
 
All that said, our primary business here is not with what determines phenomenal 
quality, but with where in space the material realizers are that instantiate such 
                                                             
3 Without giving the details, the classic arguments for externalist claims about 
mental content involve extrapolations from twin-earth-style thought experiments. 
These thought experiments were designed originally to establish externalism about 
meanings in the case of language (Putnam 1975).   
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qualities. Thus our concern is with what Hurley calls quality-enabling externalism, 
which is her term for ExPC, the view that the material realizers of phenomenal 
qualities sometimes extend beyond the skin. Quality-enabling externalism is the 
phenomenal-consciousness-related analogue of content-enabling externalism, 
according to which the material realizers of mental content extend beyond the skin, 
which is roughly equivalent to ExC.4 Inevitably, there are challenging theoretical 
issues concerning the relations that obtain between what-quality externalism and 
quality-enabling externalism,5 but, for our purposes here, only one of those issues 
matters, and that is the issue of whether the autonomy metaintuition, introduced by 
Hurley in terms of the what-determines question, applies also to the how-enabled 
(or where-realized) question. As Hurley (2010, p.148, note 10) argues, the answer is 
‘yes’, but to appreciate why, we need to understand exactly what she aims to achieve 
by introducing the metaintuition in the first place. 
 
If one simply encountered the autonomy metaintuition in isolation, one might be 
forgiven for thinking that it is no more than a neologism for the infamous hard 
problem of consciousness, but that would be to under-estimate its strategic worth, 
because what it achieves is the disentanglement of two intuitions in the vicinity of 
phenomenal consciousness that are deeply unhappy bedfellows. The key point, then, 
is that the autonomy metaintuition is widely held, by many scientists and 
philosophers, alongside a further deeply engrained intuition that, as Hurley (2010, 
p.115) notes, results in a combination  that is ‘puzzling, even paradoxical’. In the 
what-quality case, the conflicting intuition is that phenomenal quality is determined 
entirely by internal (inside-the-skin, standardly neural) factors. This leads to what 
Hurley nicely dubs the magical membrane problem. 
 
Why are intuitions favoring what-quality internalism so strong, given the 
autonomy meta-intuition? If we have no understanding of how 
phenomenal qualities could be explained, why is the conditional intuition 
so strong that if phenomenal qualities can be explained at all, it could only 
                                                             
4 I say ‘roughly equivalent’ because, depending on how one understands the notion 
of ‘content’, it may well be that not all mental phenomena for which one might seek 
physical realizers will bear content. This is especially true if content is understood to 
be representational content, and if one is impressed by, for example, 
phenomenologically-inspired arguments concerning the non-representational, yet 
cognitive, character of hitch-free skilled practical activity (see e.g. Wheeler 2005).         
5 One particularly pressing issue will be whether or not one’s view at the what level 
places constraints in one’s view at the how level. For example, could one be a what-
quality externalist and a quality-enabling internalist? In effect, this is the question 
that I raised earlier, in note 2, in the context of Ward’s response to Clark’s quality-
enabling internalism. I don’t propose to engage this issue here, but see (Wheeler, in 
preparation).         
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be in terms of internal factors?  Why does the internal-external boundary 
sustain fiercely internalist intuitions about what, if anything, must explain 
phenomenal qualities despite the general admission of bafflement about 
how anything could possibly explain phenomenal qualities, including neural 
properties? This is what I call the magical membrane problem. (Hurley 2010, 
p.115)              
 
Once the tension between the internalist intuition and the autonomy metaintuition 
in the what-quality case is exposed, the extension of the latter to the case of quality-
enabling externalism (ExPC) is revealed, since the very same kind of tension 
accompanies the realizer-oriented case.  As all the fuss about neural correlates of 
consciousness indicates, cognitive scientists and naturalistic philosophers of mind 
widely assume that the material vehicles that realize phenomenal qualities are 
internally located (that’s the internalist intuition about vehicles) while expressing 
bewilderment about precisely how anything physical could realize phenomenal 
consciousness (that’s the autonomy meta-intuition regarding vehicles). And, as we 
might put it, echoing Hurley’s own rhetorical words, if we have no understanding of 
how phenomenal qualities could be realized in neural elements, why is the 
conditional intuition so strong that if phenomenal qualities can be realized 
physically at all, it could only be in terms of internal (neural) factors (that’s the 
vehicular version of the magical membrane problem)? Indeed, one might even argue 
(although Hurley doesn’t) that the enabling case is primary. Perhaps it’s because we 
have no understanding of how phenomenal qualities could be realized in purely 
physical states and processes alone that we have no understanding of how 
phenomenal qualities could be determined by purely physical states and processes 
alone.  
 
Speculations aside, what seems clear is that the autonomy metaintuition applies 
straightforwardly to the quality-enabling case. And this suggests something rather 
interesting. One implication of the puzzling nature of the combination of internalist 
intuition and autonomy metaintuition, in the realm of phenomenal consciousness, is 
that, in terms of basic metaphysical plausibility, ExPC and orthodox vehicular 
internalism about phenomenal character are placed on an equal footing. To assume 
internalism at the outset here would be to walk headlong into the magical 
membrane problem. But that means that neither quality-enabling internalism nor 
quality-enabling externalism (neither orthodox internalism about the vehicles of 
phenomenal consciousness nor ExPC) have the right to be awarded default status in 
the debate. What this indicates, I think, is that there is an asymmetry between the 
strategic positions of ExC and ExPC. In the case of cognitive states and processes 
where no appeal to phenomenal quality is made, it’s eminently arguable that some 
form of internalism about the realizing material vehicles should be treated as the 
default view, with the burden of proof resting with ExC (Wheeler 2013). But, as I 
have just explained, no such internalist presumption is warranted in the case of the 
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vehicles of phenomenal consciousness. That’s the force of the autonomy 
metaintuition.  
 
At root, the reason for this asymmetry is, of course, that although no commentator 
on cognitive science should be foolhardy enough to conclude that the discipline is 
complete, or even on a smooth ride to completeness, nevertheless the fact is that no 
analogue of the autonomy metaintuition afflicts our understanding of the claim that 
psychological processes such as representation-building, truth-preserving inference, 
prototype categorization, memory storage, pattern-matching, and the like are 
realized in purely physical processes alone. From classical computationalism to 
connectionism to dynamical cognitive science, there are plenty of candidate models 
out there, and while there may be all sorts of explanatory problems to be overcome, 
and while some of these models will end up being dismissed as wide of the mark, 
none of them ushers in a deep sense of bewilderment as to its potential for being 
realized in the physical world, equivalent to the sense of bewilderment that is often 
engendered by phenomenal consciousness. So no analogue of the autonomy 
metaintuition can gain a foothold in that area of cognitive theory. Surprisingly, then, 
given all that earlier talk of extra hurdles to be cleared, the conclusion of the present 
line of thought is that ExPC enjoys a strategic advantage over its prima facie more 
plausible cousin, ExC. 
 
That completes my introduction of the conceptual apparatus that we will need, in 
order to understand and tackle our two target arguments from sensory substitution. 
So, without further ado, let’s turn to those arguments. The first is due to Alva Noë.   
 
3. Altered States 
 
As mentioned earlier, sensory substitution, as it will concern us here, occurs when 
technological augmentation enables one sensory modality to support the kind of 
environmental access and interaction ordinarily supported by a different sensory 
modality. The seminal work in this area is Paul Bach y Rita’s (1972; Bach y Rita and 
Kercel 2002) research on tactile-vision sensory substitution (henceforth TVSS). In this 
work, blind subjects were equipped with a head- or shoulder-mounted camera that 
conveyed information, from video images, via the activation of an array of vibrators 
located on the subject’s abdomen or thigh. After a short period of adaptation, those 
TVSS subjects who actively controlled the information received, either by 
manipulating their bodies or by manipulating the camera, were able to make reliable 
judgments about things such as the number, relative size and position of distal 
objects in three-dimensional space, and to perform actions such as reaching out and 
picking up objects. TVSS subjects have also been successful at making perceptual 
judgments involving effects such as looming and object occlusion, and (this time 
with image-sourced information transmitted via vibrators on the tongue) have 
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experienced illusory movement effects such as the waterfall illusion6 (Bach y Rita 
and Kercel  2002). TVSS is not the only form of sensory substitution. For example, in 
auditory-vision substitution (e.g. Auvray et al. 2005), video images from a camera 
are converted into sounds (e.g. the vertical positions of pixels may be correlated with 
different audio frequencies) and conveyed to the subject via headphones. Again after 
short periods of adaptation, subjects equipped with such devices have been able to 
localize, and to recognize the shapes of, distal objects in three-dimensional space.   
 
What is immediately striking about such cases of sensory substitution is that they are 
examples of a perceptual functionality that is visual, or at least vision-like (see 
below), in character, even though the proximal sensory interfaces in operation are 
either tactile or auditory in nature. If,  however, sensory substitution is going to 
provide the foundations of an argument for ExPC, mere functionality won’t be 
enough. Somewhere in the mix there has to be a claim about phenomenal 
experience. And indeed, as talk of looming and occlusion effects, and of vision-style 
illusions, already suggests, TVSS subjects are sometimes sources of experiential 
reports that indicate a transformation in perceptual consciousness. For example, 
some blind users of sensory substitution systems report visual qualia such as 
experiences of phosphenes (the seeing of light without light actually entering the 
eye) (Ortiz et al. 2011). It is because of such reports that Noë (2009 p.57) plausibly 
understands TVSS to be a ‘full-fledged, bona fide example of… [a] transformation in 
perceptual consciousness’.  To be clear, precisely how one should describe the 
transformation in consciousness involved is, as Noë himself points out, a moot point. 
Should one say that blind TVSS subjects really see, in some non-metaphorical sense 
of ‘see’, or do they ‘merely’ have vision-like (quasi-visual) experiences? This is a 
problem that propels us in the direction of the thorny question that I mentioned 
earlier, of how to individuate the senses. I think it’s fair to say that the jury remains 
out on this issue. But, for us, that really doesn’t matter, because all Noë needs, in 
order to construct his argument from sensory substitution to ExPC, is that TVSS 
engenders a transformation in perceptual consciousness such that, even though the 
proximal stimuli are tactile in character, the conscious experience in question is not 
correctly categorized as one of touch (Noë 2009, p.62). Given even the limited array of 
evidence presented above regarding the perceptual sensitivity of TVSS subjects to 
distal objects, that much seems to be beyond serious doubt. After all, touch is a way 
of accessing external elements by coming into physical contact with them – surface 
to surface, as one might say. That is not what’s going on in TVSS. And, if any extra 
argument on this point is needed, it is worth noting that it requires conscious, 
deliberate effort for TVSS subjects to have tactile experiences of the vibrations taking 
place on the surface of their skin, rather than the experiences of the distal world that 
the technological augmentation makes available to them (Noë 2009, p.62).   
                                                             
6 If one stares at a waterfall for a while, and then looks at any stationary rocks at the 




So how might one argue from the phenomenon of sensory substitution to the truth 
of ExPC? The pivotal claim in Noë’s version of the argument is this: TVSS cases 
show that ‘[neural] rewiring isn’t necessary for changes in conscious experience’ 
(Noë 2009, p.56). The first thing to appreciate is that the phrase ‘changes in conscious 
experience’ refers to those transformations in phenomenal quality in which, as we 
have just discussed, the transformation in question is from one modality of sensory 
experience to another . In TVSS, this is a transformation from touch to a modality 
that is not touch, even if it isn’t vision. Of course, if you have poor eyesight, then 
there is a sense in which putting on the right spectacles will transform your sensory 
experience, but what the technology does in this instance is provide enhanced inputs 
that boost performance within a modality. The view of the unreconstructed vehicle 
internalist is not in any way tested by the thought that, when one puts on spectacles, 
areas of the brain that were contributing to poor vision come to contribute to good 
vision, without any need for any neural rewiring. But now what about the 
transformations we care about – transformations from one sensory modality to 
another? Is neural rewiring necessary in those cases?  
 
For work that at least nudges us towards an affirmative answer to this question, and 
which additionally gives us a better sense of the kind of neural rewiring that attracts 
Noë’s attention, consider experiments on neural plasticity due to Sur and colleagues 
(Sur et al.1999, described by Noë 2009, pp.53-4). In these experiments, the 
neurophysiology of new-born ferrets was rewired so that their eyes ended up being 
connected to the parts of their brains ordinarily used for hearing. The result was that 
those regions of the ferret brain that standardly process auditory information were 
recruited for vision. This constitutes a transformation in sensory experience of the 
right kind (from one modality to another), and it is obvious that an important – one 
might even be tempted to think, necessary – factor in effecting that transformation 
was neural rewiring. But, according to Noë, what the case of TVSS tells us is that one 
shouldn’t succumb to temptation here, or at least not if, in doing so, one arrived at a 
general rule to the effect that rewiring is always necessary for the sort of 
transformation at issue. After all, in TVSS cases, there has been a transformation in 
phenomenal quality without any ferret-style connecting up of the subject’s eyes to 
the areas of her brain ordinarily associated with touch. Rather, in spite of the visual 
or vision-like phenomenal consciousness, the touch areas of the TVSS subject’s brain 
continue, as is normally the case, to receive input via tactile stimulation (vibrations 
on the skin). Why precisely is neural rewiring ruled out as an explanation here? For 
one thing, TVSS subjects adapt swiftly to their augmenting devices, with the 
transformation in experiential sensory modality happening far too quickly for the 
explanation to turn on the kind of substantial neural rewiring that we see in the 
ferret case. For another, TVSS subjects are typically adult human beings whose 
brains simply do not have the plasticity exhibited by the brains of new-born ferrets. 
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So, it looks as if Noë is right: what TVSS cases indicate is that, in the relevant sense, 
neural rewiring isn’t necessary for changes in conscious experience.  
 
This is undoubtedly an intriguing result, but how, according to Noë, does it provide 
support for ExPC? Spelling things out in a little more detail than Noë himself does, 
the argument, I think, must go something like this. Begin by assuming an orthodox 
naturalistic approach to the material realizers of phenomenal consciousness, 
according to which  phenomenal qualities are realized solely in the brain. With this 
vehicle-internalist assumption in place, and given that no significant neural rewiring 
has taken place in the TVSS subject’s brain, we seem to be left with no naturalistic 
explanation for the observed transformation in phenomenal character. For under 
these conditions of explanation, the lack of neural rewiring in TVSS cases means (so 
the argument goes) that there has been a transformation in the character of conscious 
experience without there having been any relevant change in the material vehicles 
which realize that experience. Substance dualism might have something to offer us 
by way of an explanation here, but naturalistic philosophy of mind is, it seems, 
silent. A moment’s reflection, however, indicates that if we drop the opening 
assumption, that the realizers of phenomenal quality are wholly internal, then 
naturalism is back in the game. For if phenomenal consciousness may sometimes be 
realized partly externally, then it’s the addition of some new externally-located 
realizing factors, in the guise of the TVSS-delivering technology, that promises to 
eliminate the salient explanatory gap. And that’s how the claim that neural rewiring 
isn’t necessary for a transformation in conscious experience supports ExPC. It 
throws down an explanatory challenge that ExPC can meet, but which quality-
enabling internalism can’t. Thus, Noë (2009, p.65) concludes, ‘the machinery of mind 
is extended’.     
 
It is worth pausing to note that Noë’s own brand of ExPC has some distinctive 
features. In brief, Noë’s view is that perceptual experience is constituted by implicit 
knowledge of what he calls sensorimotor contingencies – the law-like effects that 
either my movement or the movement of objects in my sensory field have on the 
sensory input that I receive (see e.g. Noë 2004, 2009; O’Regan and Noë 2001). Thus, 
for example, say I see something as a straight horizontal line. According to O’Regan 
and Noë (2001), my implicit knowledge of how sensory input will change as I move 
in particular ways is constitutive of that perceptual experience as a case of my seeing 
a straight horizontal line. Such implicit knowledge includes, for example, my 
knowledge that as I shift my visual fixation point, the curvature of the line as traced 
on my retina will change in certain reliable ways, and that, as I look away from the 
line, its cortical representation will change its shape from (roughly) that of a straight 
sausage with squashed ends to that of a banana. This approach to perceptual 
experience plausibly has the resources to explain the fact that TVSS subjects have 
vision-like experience, since the sensorimotor contingencies in play involve relations 
characteristic of visual phenomena such as looming and occlusion effects. So far, so 
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good. It is at this point, however, that an interesting question arises, regarding the 
relationship between sensorimotor contingency theory and ExPC, namely, is the 
former inevitably externalist in form, or could it, in principle, be formulated in an 
internalist register? This is a tricky question (see Silverman 2014 for enlightening 
analysis and discussion), but I don’t propose to pursue it here, because, on my 
interpretation, Noë’s argument from sensory substitution to ExPC may be 
formulated independently of sensorimotor contingency theory.7  
 
Back to the main plot. How persuasive is Noë’s argument? To my mind, the weakest 
link is the transitional conclusion that there has been a transformation in the 
character of conscious experience without there having been any relevant change in 
the neural vehicles concerned. Of course, if the only kind of neural change that could 
count as a relevant change is one that involves ferret-style neural rewiring, then 
Noë’s argument for ExPC would, I think, go through. But, as I am about to suggest, 
the situation regarding the ongoing neural contribution is not as clear-cut as Noë’s 
treatment suggests. Indeed, there are at least two ways in which other relevant 
neural changes might have occurred which, in principle at least, might explain the 
observed transformation in phenomenal consciousness, leaving the internalist free to 
reject the transitional conclusion. So these alternative scenarios constitute problems 
for Noë’s argument, as I have reconstructed it. The following point helps to bring 
things into view. In effect, Noë’s argument assumes that the realizing neural vehicle 
of interest in TVSS cases is somatasensory cortex, and somatasensory cortex alone. 
He writes:  
 
Stimulation of the skin gives rise to neural activity in touch areas of the 
brain (the so-called somatasensory cortex). But for a person who has 
adapted to the sensory substitution system, activation in somatasensory 
touch areas gives rise not to the experience of being touched (or at least 
not only to the feeling of being touched) but to a visual experience of the 
scene in front of him. (Noë 2009, p.58) 
 
Of course, even considering just the phenomenological evidence available, it’s 
unsurprising that somatasensory cortex remains active during TVSS perception. 
After all, as mentioned above, subjects are able to shift their conscious attention to 
the tactile vibrations on their skin and experience them as such. However – and here 
we are on the doorstep of the first problem for Noë’s argument – it is an aspect of the 
ExPC-justifying set-up, as Noë presents it, that no other region of the brain that 
might realize the transformed phenomenal quality – a region such as, for example 
visual cortex – is activated crossmodally along with somatasensory cortex. If areas in 
                                                             
7 Further investigation of the issues just raised would, once again, lead us to engage 
with the kinds of questions introduced (but not explored) in notes 2 and 5 above.   
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visual cortex are included in the realizer of the post-transformation phenomenal 
quality, then quality-enabling internalism remains a live explanatory option.  
 
This is obviously a matter ripe for empirical investigation, so what do the existing 
imaging and stimulation studies tell us? The data is a little messy. Some studies of 
sensory substitution show activation in visual areas in early blind subjects but not in 
sighted subjects. However, others show activation in visual areas during recognition 
and localization tasks in early blind, late blind and (less  regularly) blindfolded 
sighted subjects. Moreover, studies in which parts of the brain are deactivated in 
order to establish causal links between particular areas and subject performance  
indicate that sensory substitution devices can recruit visual cortex.8 Further 
complications are introduced by the fact that late blind users, who of course have 
been sighted, may use visualization capacities that activate visual cortex in a top-
down way (Stiles and Shimojo forthcoming). There are, of course, many questions of 
detail to be asked here, especially regarding the organizational nature and the 
adaptive timescales of the apparent crossmodal plasticity and interaction. The point 
for us, however, is this: the success of Noë’s argument from sensory substitution 
depends on the empirical bet that visual cortex is not activated alongside 
somatasensory cortex in sensory substitution subjects. That bet may well be lost.      
 
Still, let’s assume that, for some subjects anyway, that bet is won: for those subjects, 
the realizing neural vehicle of interest is definitely somatasensory cortex alone. 
Under these circumstances, would Noë’s argument from sensory substitution be 
rehabilitated? I am not convinced that it would. The crucial claim, recall, is that, in 
sensory substitution subjects, there has been a transformation in the character of 
conscious experience without there having been any relevant change in the neural 
vehicles concerned. Noë’s benchmark for a relevant change in the neural vehicles is 
ferret-style rewiring, and it’s the thought that this sort of extensive rewiring can’t 
have happened which helps secure the externalist conclusion. But now what about 
another possible kind of neural change – a fundamental change in the mathematical 
structure of the neural activation patterns in somatasensory cortex? If a fundamental 
change in activity patterns in the same neural area, without any actual rewiring, and 
without any relevant change in the neuro-sensory input channel, can produce a 
transformation in the modality of the perceptual experience, from, say, touch to 
vision or quasi-vision, then Noë’s argument for ExPC won’t go through, because 
there will be a vehicle-internalist explanation for the target change in experience.  
 
How should one respond to this suggestion? Connectionist research in artificial 
intelligence and cognitive science has of course made us familiar with the idea that 
                                                             
8 The summary conclusions from imaging and stimulation studies listed here are 
taken from a recent review paper (Stiles and Shimojo forthcoming), where a large 
number of references to specific studies may be found.  
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phase transitions in the activation dynamics of neural-style networks can generate 
very different systemic behaviour, without any structural reconfiguration of the 
units and connections (without any neural rewiring). Nevertheless one might remain 
suspicious of the my tentative claim that such phase transitions may produce a 
transformation not only in the functional behaviour of the system, but also in the 
modality of sensory experience. It is at this point, however, that we need to remind 
ourselves of Hurley’s autonomy metaintuition, as applied to the quality-enabling 
domain. That intuition is that we have no understanding of how phenomenal 
qualities could be realized in physical or functional elements. Deployed in the 
service of ExPC, the next stop is the magical membrane problem. But, at this point in 
the debate, the autonomy metaintuition can equally be deployed in a deviant 
fashion, that is, in the service of quality-enabling internalism. For if we have no 
understanding of how phenomenal qualities could be realized in physical or 
functional elements, why is the intuition so strong that if phenomenal qualities can 
be realized physically at all, that realization must be specified at the level of neural 
wiring, rather than at the level of patterns of activation.  What this deviant use of the 
autonomy metaintuition suggests is that we should remain open-minded about the 
possibility that phase transitions in neural activation dynamics which take place 
without structural reconfiguration (neural rewiring) might nevertheless produce 
shifts in the modality of conscious experience. This is, of course, a long way from a 
knockout blow against Noë’s argument from sensory substitution. For one thing, the 
autonomy metaintuition also urges us to be open-minded about partly external 
physical realizers of phenomenal consciousness. But it does suggest that the 
argument fails to deliver a decisive outcome in the dispute between ExPC and 
quality-enabling internalism.    
 
4. Technology Incorporated  
 
Before closing, I want to consider, rather more briefly, an alternative argument from 
sensory substitution, one due to Kiverstein and Farina (2012). This argument turns 
on a redeployment of Clark’s (2008) distinction between the ‘use’ of a tool and its 
‘incorporation’. As Kiverstein and Farina (2012, p.36, quoting partly from Clark) 
explain, the incorporation of a tool, as opposed to its mere use, occurs when ‘the 
brain has been recalibrated so as ‘to automatically take account of new bodily and 
sensory opportunities’’. The prototypical example offered of incorporation is 
Maravita and Iriki’s (2004) study of modifications in the body schema (the brain’s 
model of the body in space) during tool use. In this study, macaques are trained to 
use rakes to retrieve food. As a result of this training, the body schema in the 
macaque brain is updated so that it counts the rake as ’part of’ the monkey’s body. 
(More precisely, bimodal neurons adjust their receptive fields so as to respond to 
stimuli located at the end of the rake.) According to Kiverstein and Farina, it’s 
precisely this kind of neural recalibration that causally underpins the 
phenomenological experience in which an expertly manipulated tool is rendered 
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transparent to agential consciousness. (Recall the famous example of the blind 
person whose cane is so fluidly integrated into her navigational activity that the 
phenomenologically fixed boundary between agent and world is shifted from the 
body-cane interface to the end of the cane.) Kiverstein and Farina observe that this is 
exactly the kind of experience enjoyed by sensory substitution subjects, whose 
phenomenological interface with the world is not, under normal circumstances, the 
body-technology tactile interface, which becomes transparent, but rather the 
technology-world interface that aligns with their vision-like consciousness. Putting 
together the pieces of the picture, the authors suggest, quite plausibly, that, during 
sensory substitution, the subject’s neurally-realized body schema will have been 
modified, so that the augmenting technology is internally represented as being part 
of the subject’s body. The result is that sensory substitution exemplifies the 
phenomenon of incorporation. 
 
Kiverstein and Farina take incorporation to be sufficient for ExPC. As they put it, 
where there is incorporation, ‘the substrate of the experiences of the user extends to 
include the device’ (Kiverstein and Farina 2012, p.35). So, if sensory substitution is a 
case of incorporation, and if incorporation is sufficient for ExPC, then sensory 
substitution is sufficient for ExPC. Let’s agree that sensory substitution is a case of 
incorporation. Is incorporation sufficient for ExPC? The answer, I think, is ‘no’. It’s 
simply hard to know why a modification to the internal representational resources 
of the subject – a modification to the neurally located machinery that determines 
how the agent categorizes portions of the world as body and not-body – should have 
the implication that the material vehicles where phenomenal conscious is realized 
now include the elements that have been newly represented as body rather than not-
body. The inference remains puzzling, I think, even where those neural 
modifications have the added effect of showing up in experience as the transparency 
of the technology to phenomenal consciousness. To put things in a mildly imprecise 
way, what has certainly changed is the experience of where the bodily boundary is 
located. What hasn’t thereby changed is where, in relation to the bodily boundary, 
experiences are located.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, I have examined two arguments for the claim that the material vehicles 
that realize phenomenal consciousness extend beyond the skin. Both of these 
arguments turn on a treatment of the intriguing phenomenon of sensory 
substitution. My depressingly negative conclusion is that neither argument is 
successful.  Of course, this doesn’t show that the hypothesis of extended 
phenomenal consciousness is false. The decisive supporting argument may, right 
now, be waiting in the philosophical shadows, poised to leap out on unsuspecting 
passing internalists. If that’s right, however, the argument in question will need 
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